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Introduction 
Over the past three decades, free trade agreements (FTAs) have become an integral and 
enduring part of the global trading system. The number of FTAs notified to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) increased from 19 in 1990 to 292 by January 2019.3 The government of 
Sri Lanka has recently embraced the newfound global fondness for FTA as a key focus of the 
national trade and development strategy.  ‘Pursuing … free trade agreements with all major 
trading partners’ figures prominently in the government’s New Trade Policy issued in June 
2017 (Government of Sri Lanka 2017, 17). The rationale of this policy choice has, however, 
been intensely debated in the Sri Lankan policy circles. The purpose of this article is to assess 
this debate.  
 
The paper begins with as overview of the role of FTAs as an alternative to multilateral 
and unilateral liberalisation to provide the context for the Sri Lankan debate. This is followed 
by an assessment of the trade outcome of the Sri Lanka – India free trade agreement 
(SLIFTA) and Sri Lanka- Pakistan free trade agreement (SLPFTA). The next section makes 
some observations on the likely impact of the Sri Lanka–Singapore free trade agreement 
(SLSFTA).  The closing section offers some concluding remarks. The focus of this paper is 
solely on the economic rationale of FTAs, even though political considerations play a key 
role in the proliferation of FTAs.   
 
 
 
  
                                                            
3 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/Charts.aspx 
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Free trade agreements in the World Trade System:  An overview 
 
FTAs and trade opening 
By definition, a free trade agreement ( FTA) is a treaty  between two or more countries under 
which all tariffs are eliminated on goods produced in member countries, while keeping tariffs 
on trade with non-member countries.  However, in practice, tariff concessions are given on a 
selective basis, depending on lobby-group pressure in the process of FTA negotiation and 
perhaps genuine concerns about industrial adjustment problems associated with trade opening.  
The coverage of the eligibility list varies significantly among FTAs.  Even for the products 
included on the eligibility list, tariff preferences are not automatic but subject to meeting rules 
of origins (RoOs), which are an integral part of any FTA. For these reasons, the term ‘free trade 
agreement’ is, in fact, a misnomer; the more meaningful term, which is preferred  by prominent 
trade economists,  is ‘preferential trade agreement’ (PTA).  However, in this article we stick to 
the popular term, FTA (Bhagwati et al 1998, Bhagwati 2008). 
In an FTA, unlike in a customs union (CU),4 the participant countries maintain their 
own external tariffs, which usually differ between member countries, while offering 
concessional tariffs to the member countries. Thus, it is necessary to combine tariff concessions 
with RoO to prevent ‘trade deflection’, that is, transhipment of goods from non-member 
countries through the member country with the lowest external tariffs to other FTA members. 
If eligibility criteria imposed for the identification of the true originating of products are 
stringent and the related administrative mechanism is cumbersome or corrupt, then RoOs can 
diminish, or even render worthless, the preference margin offered to traders (Krishna 2006). 
There is always possibility to tweak RoOs or delay the approval process in response to lobby 
group pressure to undermine the expected trade opening under an FTA (Falvey and Reed 2002).  
Because of these reasons, how the RoO are designed and implemented matter a lot for 
understanding how much market access an FTA really confers.  
The RoO are set based on two criteria: regional value content (RVC) and change of 
tariff classification (CTC) (Krishna 2006, Athukorala & Kohpaiboon 2011). The RVC criterion 
requires that the cost of material and processing cost within the FTA member countries 
                                                            
4 A CU is an FTA with the member countries imposing a common external tariff on a given product (European 
Union (EU), Central American Common Market (CACM) and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are 
examples).   Given common external tariffs, transhipment is not an issue relating to CUs (Panagariya 2000) 
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represent a set minimum proportion of the value of the final product. The CTC criterion 
requires that the ‘non-originating material’ (that is, intermediate inputs imported from non-
member countries) used in production belongs to a different commodity code (category) of the 
Harmonised System (HS). Until recently, the RVC criterion was by far the dominant norm used 
in setting RoO.  Designing and application of RoOs have become increasingly complicated in 
recent years because of the rapid growth of international fragmentation of production: the 
geographical separation of activities involved in producing a good (or service) across two or 
more countries within vertically integrated production systems. It is difficult to apply the 
standard value-added criteria in a context where trade in parts and components and final 
assembly occur in different countries, because assembly in a given location within a production 
networks has a very thin value-added content. For this reason, most FTAs now use a mixture 
of the two criteria.  
In applying the CTC criterion, the shifting of HS classifications is usually expressed at 
the chapter (two-digit), heading (four-digit) or sub-heading (six-digit) level of the HS system 
of classification. The specific level of the HS classification chosen makes a significant 
difference in the case of manufactured goods, as the good is usually ‘made’ from the other 
items in the given chapter or the heading to which it belongs. Specification of the ‘HS change 
level’ by chapter is more restrictive than a change at the heading level, which in turn is more 
restrictive than a change at the sub-heading level. 
Within the limits set by the actual products coverage and RoOs, the actual trade 
outcome of an FTA depends on two key factors: ‘supply response’, and ‘trade compatibility’. 
The term ‘supply response’ here refers to capacity of an economy to increase supply of exports 
as well as to achieve productivity gains by facing import competition under an FTA.  It depends 
on a wide range of factors, many of which fall outside the ambit of an FTA. These factors 
include not only trade and industry policy, but also the country’s trade-related institutional 
infrastructure, human resource development and all the other elements determining the 
flexibility of the economy responded to emerging opportunities in the global economy. 
The term ‘trade compatibility’ means the extent to which the trade patterns of a given 
country match with that of its partner country:  whether products exported by a given partner 
country are the ones mostly imported by the other partner country and the vice versa.  The 
degree of trade compatibility depends on a country’s comparative advantage in international 
production, which intern depends on the nature of resource endowment and the stage of 
economic development. The economic size of the country also matters because larger counties 
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generally tend to have a more diversified product mix.  Most of the FTAs listed in the policy 
debate as ‘success’ cases (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ( NAFTA), 
Vietnam – US FTAs and  FTAs of Australia and New Zealand with China) are between 
countries with strong trade compatibility on both import and export sides. 
In recent years, FTAs have evolved and gone beyond trade liberalisation into provisions 
for institutional harmonization between the member countries relating to intellectual property, 
health and safety issues, labour standards, labour migration, investment proportion and 
protection, banking and finance, investor-state dispute settlement and others. The FTAs with 
such multiple provisions are now popularly known as ‘modern FTAs’. The stated rationale for 
broadening the coverage of reforms is to achieve deep economic integration among the member 
countries going beyond what can be achieved through the shallow cross-border integration 
through trade reforms. There is, however, scepticism on how much deeper FTAs can go beyond 
the possibilities offered by the WTO process or unilateral reforms.  These concerns have been  
widely debated relating relating in particular to provisions on cross border investment and 
labour migration  (Krishna 2014).   
 
Trade effects of FTAs 
With the proliferation of  FTAs as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the share of world 
trade accounted for by member countries of FTAs increased from 28% in 1990 to over 55% by 
the end of the first decade of 2000s (WTO 2011).  These figures are often misleadingly quoted 
in the Sri Lankan policy debate to imply that Sri Lanka is going to be marginalised in world 
trade unless get into the FTA game (Government of Sri Lanka 2017, Ratnayake 2017). 
However, the recorded total trade of FTA partner countries is not the same as trade 
occurring under trade preferences offered by FTAs. According to calculations by the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), only 30% of world trade takes place on preferential basis, but this 
figure drops to 16% when trade within the European Union (which is a CU) is excluded (WTO 
2011). The available evidence on the operation of FTAs in Asian countries also suggests that 
the utilisation of tariff concessions offered under FTAs are rather low, ranging from 5% to 20% 
across different product categories (Cheongh and Choc 2009, Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon 
2017, Menon 2014, ). There is also evidence that the utilisation rates are often firm or industry 
specific. Normally, utilisation rates are high for large firms and firms with close trade and FDI 
ties or those located in specific industries where complying with RoO requirements are simple 
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and straightforward.  The upshot is that, not only the actual trade effect of FTA is low, but also 
FTAs are unlikely to have the potential to promote trade in a neutral and broad-based fashion. 
Why the actual trade effect of FTAs is much lower than what the FTA enthusiast claim?  
First, much of the trade between FTA members is in goods on which MFN tariff rates are zero 
or rather small in the first place. Most countries also provide dusty free accession to imported 
inputs used in export production through free trade zone (FTZ) schemes and duty drawback 
schemes. Second, goods that are subject to high tariffs are often excluded from the list of 
products earmarked for duty concessions in most FTAs.  Third, world electronics trade is 
virtually free of duty thanks to WTO's Information Technology Agreement ITA), which came 
into effect in 2006 (WTO 2017). Fourth, and perhaps more importantly, traders in many 
countries simply ignore FTA tariff concessions because of the administrative cost and other 
administrative complications. 
The ITA, concluded at the WTO’s Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996, is a 
pluralistic agreement that requires participant countries to eliminate tariffs on a specific list of 
information technology products (computers, semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing 
and testing equipment, telecommunication equipment, computer software, and scientific 
instruments).   So far 75 countries have signed the ITA. These countries account for about 97 
% of world trade in IT products.  IT products covered by the agreement amount to about 34% 
of total world manufacturing trade. A country that become a signatory to a pluralistic agreement 
opens its market to both member- and non-member countries. 
A point often made by proponents of FTAs is exports from Sri Lanka are not growing 
fast because the country is lagging the fast-growing countries in Asia in signing FTAs. 
(Government of Sri Lanka 2017, Ratnayake 2017). This observation is simply a 
misinterpretation of ‘coexistence’ as ‘causality’.  These countries (and, in fact, all high 
performing countries in East Asia) had become dynamic exporting nations well before the new 
penchant for signing FTAs (Perkin 2013).  In fact, South Korea and Taiwan achieved supper-
past export growth in the 1980s in a hostile international environment with high tariffs and 
quantitative restriction in most destination countries. Broader unilateral reforms with emphasis 
on export orientation was the key to their export success (Rodrik 2018a). In any case, as noted 
above, the available evidence suggests that only a small share of Asian countries’ trade occurs 
under the existing FTAs: FTAs are mostly ‘window dressing’.  It is also important to note that 
most of these countries are signatories to the ITA and hence FTAs are virtually irrelevant for 
the electronics industry, which cover on average over a half of each of these countries exports.  
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The proponents of FTAs may ask why countries are so enthusiastic in signing FTAs if 
the actual trade flow effect is very low.  This issue has been well addressed in the recent 
literature on FTAs (Rodrik 2018b, Cattaneo 2009, Irvin 2018, Krishna 2014). First, countries 
sign FTAs as much for foreign policy and security reasons as for economic reasons. Second, 
there is the so-called ‘bandwagon’ effect, the tendency to follow others without considering 
actual economy implication. Third, as discussed below, there is a tendency on the part of the 
politician and technocrats to place greater emphasis on the FTA path to trade opening for 
various non-economic reasons.  In sum, an FTA is rarely, if ever, based on a single motive, the 
contracting parties to an FTA often have different and sometimes even conflicting objectives  
 
The proponents of FTAs often mention that the increased emphasis on signing FTAs 
reflects deep frustration resulted from the failure to make substantial progress with the Doha 
Round of Multilateral trade negotiation initiated in 2001.  However, an inspection of the annual 
data on the reporting of FTAs to WTO clearly shows that proliferation of FTAs started around 
the time of successful completing of Uruguay Round negotiation that significantly brought 
down trade barriers worldwide under the newly restabled WTO.  Over 60 of the existing FTAs 
care into effect between 1994 and the year of launching of the Doha Round (2001), when there 
were high hopes of further reforms under the WTO.  It seems that the launching of the NAFTA 
in January 1994, a landmark in the history of regional trading arrangements, and positive  
prognoses made by some prominent economists of NAFTA’s trade effects (eg Summers 1991,  
Krugman 1991, seem to have had a significant demonstration effect on the proliferation of 
FTAs in the ensuing years. 
Do FTAs play a vital role in attracting foreign direct investment? The available 
empirical evidence on this issue is mixed, at best.   Moreover, the available ‘positive’ evidence 
relates predominantly to FTAs involving developed and developing countries (Stevens et al. 
2016).  The best inference possible from the available evidence is that FTAs can play a role at 
the margin if and only of other preconditions required for making the country an attractive 
place for  FDI are met.  It is also important to note that signing bilateral investment protection 
treaties (BIPTs) is an alternative to FTAs for facilitating FDI. However, regardless of whether 
a country sign an FTA or a BIPT, the outcome depends on complementary supply-side reforms 
(Dollar et al 2005, Hallward-Driemeier 2003, Stevens et al. 2016). 
Often ignored in the FTA debate in Sri Lanka and elsewhere untoward developmental 
implications of the newfound enthusiasm for signing FTAs.  In the negotiation and 
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implementation process of an FTA, the attention of policy makers is often distracted from these 
vital supply-side issues.  This is because FTA negotiation has its own attractions to the political 
leadership and the high-level technocrats compared to domestic reforms.  FTAs help attracting 
media attention (‘photo opportunities’) and foreign dignitaries visiting countries like (or 
request) to sign agreements. Negotiating FTAs is also relatively less cumbersome compared to 
handling messy domestic supply-side issues.  Whatever the drivers may be, the policy bias in 
favour of FTAs has significant (but hidden) cost to the economy: in a country with limited 
technocratic and institutional capabilities. There is always the possibility of a costly trade-off 
between signing FTAs and undertaking much needed supply-side reforms (Cattaneo 2009,  
Bhagwati et al 1998).  
With the proliferation of FTAs, tariff structure of a country will become highly 
differentiated, giving rise to inefficiencies in resource allocation.  Overlapping of the standard 
MFN tariff and FTA tariff concessions, and multiple ‘rules of origin’ attached to the later 
complicate customs of administration and weaken efficiency improvements in the custom 
system and opens up opportunities for corruption (Bhagwati 2008,  Krishna 2014, Arvin 2008). 
  
FTAs and Sri Lanka’s trade performance  
This section begins with a stage-setting discussion of the relative importance of supply-side 
and demand-side factors for Sri Lanka’s export performance and the compatibility of Sri 
Lankan trade patterns with that of the existing and potential FTA partners.  This is followed by 
a preliminary assessment of the trade outcome of SLIFTA and SLPFTA. 
Supply and Demand in export expansion 
Perhaps the best readily available indicator of the relative importance of demand and supply 
factors in determining a countries export performance is its share in total world exports. A 
continuously decline is the world market share implies that the country has not been able to 
exploit existing world market opportunities because of supply constraints.   If that is the case, 
market opening by signing FTAs is unlikely to have an appreciable effect on export expansion.  
Figure 1 depicts Sir Lanka’s share of world exports separately for total exports 
(excluding petroleum) and manufactured goods.  Sri Lanka’s share in world exports s increased 
from 0.05% in the mid-1980s to about 0.11% in 2000, underpinned by significant trade and 
FDI reforms undertaken concurrently during this period.  It has then declined continuously, 
reverting to the level in the 1980s by 2017.   The time patterns of both data series are strikingly 
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similar.  This suggests that slowing of the export growth of both primary products and 
manufactured goods during the last two decades has been driven primarily by domestic supply-
side factors. Exports from the country has failed to keep up with the expansion of world 
demand.  There is ample evidence that policy slippages on the supply side, rather than failure 
to join the FTA-club was the fundamental reason behind this lackluster export record 
(Rajapatirana 2016, Athukorala 2017).  
 
 
Source: Data compiled from UN Comtrade database. 
The data presented in Table 1 on Sri Lanka’s exports to the European Union and the 
utilisation rates of GSP concessions reinforce the inference made above.  In fact, GSP 
utilisation rate is a much better indicator of the relative importance of supply-side factors 
relating to the FTA debate:  In terms of facilitating export expansion through concessionary 
market entry, a GSP scheme is similar to an FTA even though the underlying modalities are 
different.  
The GSP utilisation rate of Sri Lankan exports to the EU has declined sharply from 
about 73.8 in 2009 to 54.8 in 2017, with only minor year-to-year changes.   The country-level 
GSP utilisation rates for the same data source (not reported here for brevity) suggest that Sri 
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Lanka’s average utilization rate is lower than all GSP-eligible countries in Asia, let alone   most 
GSP-eligible African countries.5     
 
Table 1:  Si Lanka’s exports to the European Union (EU), 1999-2017 
 Exports (Mn Euro) GSP 
utilisation 
rate   Total exports GSP eligible exports  
Exports 
under GSP 
2009 1947 1615 1192 73.8 
2010 2123 1745 1270 72.8 
2011 2239 1775 1177 66.3 
2012 2250 1763 1072 60.8 
2013 2039 1644 989 59.6 
2014 2161 1798 1072 59.6 
2015 2340 1967 1078 54.8 
2016 2403 2030 1106 54.5 
2017 2635 2264 1240 54.8 
 Source:  Compiled from data obtained from the EU Statistical office. 
 
 Trade compatibility  
The trade compatibility index estimated for Sri Lankan’s import and export  with India, 
Pakistan, Singapore and a sample of other countries during 2015-17 are reported in Table 2 .  
Three-year averages are used here in order to reduce the influence of any annual irregular 
variation in trade data.  A high coefficient of compatibility on the export side implies that an 
FTA between Sri Lanka and an importing country would have a high likelihood of increasing 
exports from the former to the latter.  Likewise, high coefficient of compatibility on the import 
side implies that an FTA with a given country has a high likelihood of increasing imports to 
Sri Lanka from that country. 
It is important to note that this index provides for only an ordinal inference: we can 
infer from it only whether one agreement make more sense than other from the point of view 
of a given country.  The index cannot yield an inference of cardinal nature, such as the expected 
size of trade, or trade creation or trade diversion following one agreement or another no, for 
that matter, will they tell whether the agreement is expected to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Michaely 
1996, Yeats 1999). 
                                                            
5 Data are not yet available to assess the impact of the recent reintroduction of GSP+. 
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The value of the index is significantly larger for both export and imports with developed 
countries (USA, Germany and UK) compared to countries in the region, which are the focus 
of current FTA negotiations in Sri Lanka. This contrast is consistent with the available evidence 
that trade gains for developing countries from their FTAs with developed countries (South – 
North agreements) is likely to be greater compared to those among developing countries 
(South-South agreements) (Stevens et al 2015).  
 
Table 2: Indices of compatibility of  Sri Lanka’s trade with sleeted countries, 2015-171 
 Exports  (Cxjmk)1 Imports  Cmjxk2 
India 0.21 0.68 
Pakistan 0.25 0.35 
Singapore 0.14 0.31 
China 0.11 0.71 
Thailand 0.09 0.23 
USA 0.68 0.61 
European Union 0.67 0.58 
     Germany 0.64 0.62 
     UK 0.59 0.48 
Note:   
(1)  Three-year avenges (Three-years averages are used here in order to reduce the influence of any 
annual irregular variation in trade data. 
(2) Index of compatibility of exports of country   j  (Sri Lanka) with imports of county k 
Cxjmk    =  1 – 0.5 Ʃ|xij –mik| 
(3)  Index of compatibility of imports of country  j  (Sri Lanka) with exports  of county k 
Cmjxk    =  1 – 0.5 Ʃ|mij –xik| 
where,  xij  share of good i in total exports of country j, mij  share of good i in total imports of country j,  
xik  share of good i in total exports of country k; mik : share of good i in total imports of country k: and | 
|  indicates absolute value (i.e. regardless of sign)’ 
Source:   Computed using data from UN Comtrade database (SITC Rev 3, at the five-digit level) 
 
Sri Lanka’s trade compatibility with India on the exports side is much smaller (0.21) 
compared to that on the import side (0.68).  These is no notable difference between the export 
complementarity index and imports complementarity index relating to Pakistan, and the latter 
is much smaller (0.35) compared to that with India (0.68).   As we will see below Sri Lanka’s 
trade patterns under the FTAs with these two countries are broadly consistent with one would 
expect based on trade compatibility indices.  The indices also suggest that, under the existing 
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trade patterns, we cannot expect much export expansion from FTAs with Singapore, Thailand 
or China. 
 
Sri Lanka – India Free Trade Agreement (SLIFTA) 
The SLIFTA was signed in December 1998 and it became operational in March 2000.  The 
agreement covers only merchandise trade (traded goods).  In 2005, Sri Lanka and India initiated 
negotiations to extend the SLFTA into a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA), which would cover services and investment in addition to broadening commodity 
coverage of trade liberalisation.  
The SLIFTA adopts a negative list approach to trade liberalisation. To begin with India-
Sri Lanka FTA (ISLFTA), India provided Sri Lanka duty concessions (90-100% duty 
exemptions) on 1351 items (at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System).  However, tea 
and garments produced with non-Indian fabrics were subject to import quotas and could enter 
India only through designated ports.  In early 2003, 2,799 more items were added to the 
concession list, port-of-entry restrictions on tea and garments were relaxed and the quota on 
garment imports was expanded.  Trade preferences granted by Sri Lanka to India are more 
extensive and larger in proportional terms, but concessions have been granted mostly on 
products for which MFN tariffs are already very low. Most of food products exported from 
India, which have considerable potential for rapid market penetration in Sri Lanka, remain on 
the negative list with high import duties. The RoOs of  the agreement are a combination of 
RVC and CTS: value added 35% of FOB value if the inputs come from both countries or 25% 
if inputs conform one of the two countries.; final product have a different classification 
compared to intermediate inputs at the 4-digit HS level. The agreement incorporates special 
and differential treatment provisions to factor in Sri Lanka’s smaller economic size (Kelegama 
2014, Weerakoon 2001).   
A claim made in various government reports and by proponents of FTA is that Sri 
Lanka has been a net gainer of  the SLIFTA: exports under the agreement account for over 
60% of total exports  to India whereas  only a smaller share of  import (about 10%) is covered 
by the agreement (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2018,  Kelegama 2014).  However, a close look 
at the data suggests that this is a rather simplistic interpretation of the actual trade outcome 
under the agreement (Table 2). 
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Table 2:  Sri Lanka – India merchandise trade, 2000 -2017 
 Exports (USD mn) Imports (US$ mn) India’s share in Sri 
Lanka’s trade (%) 
Trade 
balance as 
% of 
exports  
 Total SLIFTA SLIFTA 
share in 
exports (%) 
Total SLIFTA SLFTA 
share in 
imports 
Exports Imports  
2000 56 9 16 600 54 9 1.7 14.1  
2001 70 16 23 601 113 19 2.3 14.4 -757.1 
2002 169 114 68 834 82 10 3.7 18.2 -394.0 
2003 241 239 99 1076 150 14 5.0 22.1 -346.2 
2004 385 340 88 1342 395 29 7.1 22.9 -248.1 
2005 559 543 97 1399 246 18 8.9 20.7 -150.3 
2006 494 431 87 1822 459 25 7.1 21.2 -268.8 
2007 516 398 77 2785 385 14 6.7 23.1 -439.3 
2008 418 309 74 3007 541 18 5.2 24.5 -619.2 
2009 325 219 67 1710 372 22 4.5 17.8 -426.3 
2010 467 358 77 2546 574 23 5.5 19.1 -445.7 
2011 522 392 75 4349 580 13 4.9 21.9 -733.9 
2012 566 380 67 3517 156 4 5.8 19.0 -521.0 
2013 543 369 65 3093 393 13 5.2 17.6 -469.2 
2014 625 376 60 3978 540 14 5.6 20.7 -536.6 
2015 643 406 63 4273 240 6 6.1 22.5 -564.6 
2016 551 375 68 3828 187 5 5.4 19.9 -594.4 
2017 689 442 64 4496 257 6 6.1 21.6 -552.1 
Source:  Combined from data provided by the Department of Commerce and from The Central Bank, Annual 
report (for total trade)  
 
There was a surge of exports from Sri Lanka to India during the first seven to eight 
years following the agreement came into force.  This was mainly due to exports of vanaspati 
(refined hydrogenated oil, listed under HS 151620) and primary copper (extracted from 
imported from scrap metal) (HS7403). These products accounted for over nearly 60 % of total 
Sri Lankan export to India during this period. However, the expansion of these exports was not 
driven by Sri Lanka’s comparative advantage in their production compared to India.  Rather, it 
was because Indian manufactures invested heavily in Sri Lanka to produce these products to 
reap gains from lower Sri Lankan tariffs on required main inputs (crude palm oil for Vanaspati 
production and scrap metal for extracting primary copper) and preferential (under zero tariff) 
entry of the end products to India under the FTA (Athukorala 2014).   
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The export dynamism of vanaspati and copper was short lived, however.  Under strong 
pressure from the Indian Vanaspati Producers Association, India subsequently cut its import 
tariffs on palm oil from 70% in the early 1990s to 7.5% in January 2008 and then to zero in 
March 2008 and imposed stringent tariff rate quotas on vanaspati imports from Sri Lanka.  
Consequently, vanaspati exports disappeared from Sri Lanka’s export list from about 2009.  In 
the case of copper, from 2008 India begun to regulate imports from Sri Lanka based on its own 
domestic value addition estimates made using the London Metal Exchange prices This 
remarkable policy response was based on India’s concerns about the validity of the RoO 
certificates issued by the Sri Lankan Department of Commerce.  Following the introduction of 
the stringent procedure for approving market access, a large proportion of Sri Lankan copper 
exports Lanka because ineligible for entering India under the FTA tariff concessions.   
During the ensuing years, Sri Lankan exports to India of some other products were also 
subject form time to time various forms of ‘administrative protection’  such as stringent food 
safety regulations, delaying customs clearance and changes made in the list of ports demarcated 
for the entry of Sri Lanka goods (Pal 2015). There is also anecdotal evidence that some Sri 
Lanka exporters have begun to shun the FTA and export under the MFN tariffs because of the 
cumbersome and costly procedures involved in obtaining RoO certificates and delays in import 
clearance at the Indian ports  
 Reflecting the combined effect of all these factors, the share of Sri Lanka’s exports to 
India covered by the SLIFTA declined from a peak of 97%  in 2005 to about 64% during the 
past five years.   The share of total exports to India declined from about 8.5% in the early 2000s 
to 6.4% during 2015-17.  Even these figures need to be treated with caution because of some 
cases of alleged ‘trade deflection’ (that is, rerouting some products) of some products from 
other countries to India via Sri Lank through alleged manipulation of the country of origin 
certification.  There have been a number of highly-publicised cases of rerouting  via Sri Lanka 
to India of areca nuts from Indonesia and black pepper from Vietnam.  
The food safety regulations and other administrative restrictions imposed by India on 
imports from Sri Lanka from time to time clearly support the view that, in practice, 
implementation of a bilateral FTA is highly susceptible to domestic lobby group pressures, 
particularly when the FTA partner is a large country with greater bargaining power.  
Presumably, a small country like Sri Lanka has a much better chance of resolving these issues 
through the multilateral dispute settlement process of the WTO.  Involvement of other WTO 
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members is the dispute settlement process could help overcome resistance arising at the 
bilateral level.  An interesting example is the resolution of the Sri Lanka– EU dispute relating 
to cinnamon exports (https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/sps_oct06_e.htm).  In 
2006, some member countries of the EU introduced a de-facto banned on imports of cinnamon 
from Sri Lanka because of sulphur dioxide (SO2) content. Sri Lankan authorities were able to 
successfully resolve the dispute by appealing to the WTO  under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(Animal and Plant Health) agreement.  The settlement of the issue involved adoption of a new 
international food safety standard for cinnamon that helped ensuring transference in food safety 
monitoring in international cinnamon trade.  
It is often claimed that, under the SLIFTA India has become the second largest 
destination for Sri Lankan exports.  However, India accounts for only about 6% of Sri Lankan 
exports compared to the 26% share of the largest destination country, the USA.   A close look 
at the commodity composition of exports cast doubt about possibilities for further expansion 
of exports from Sri Lanka to India.   Most of the agricultural products , which accounts for the 
bulk of total exports  to India are subject to supply constraints.  Sri Lanka’s  total (world) 
exports of some agricultural products (cinnamon, cloves, black pepper) have increased at a 
much slower rates or even hardly increased, suggesting that increase in exports to India 
involved diversion of exports from other markets propelled by duty free market access rather 
than by a net increase in domestic production.  Most of the manufactured goods exported from 
Sri Lanka under the FTA benefit from high MFN import tariffs in India, and are, therefore, 
susceptible to further unilateral trade liberalisation in India.  Garments, the main manufacturing 
export of Sri Lanka, account for less than 3% of Sri Lankan exports to India.   As a labour 
abundant country, it is unlikely that India is prepared to substantially expose its garment 
industry to competition from Sri Lanka on a bilateral basis.   
The picture is very different on the import side. The share of imposts from India has on 
average accounted over 20% of Sri Lanka’s total merchandise exports during 2000-17, even 
though. imports under SLIFTA account for a small and declining share in Sri Lanka’s total 
imports from India, averaging to a mere 6% during this period.  This pattern is consistent with 
Sri Lanka’s high trade compatibility (explained below) with India on the import side.  The high 
compatibility is in fact what we would expect in trade between a small country and a giant 
trading pattern with a highly diversified production base.  India has a even though large and 
diversified production base compared to Sri Lanka and most of the products in Sri Lanka’s 
import baskets are produced in India at internationally competitive prices. Moreover, Sri Lanka 
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is a low-tariff country in the region with significant number of zero-duty tariff lines.   Given 
the strong trade compatibility and low import tariff, tariff concessions granted under the 
SLIFTA are not a significant determinants of Sri Lanka’s imports from India.   On the export 
side, the small share of exports to India (6%)  seems to reflect the low degree of compatibility 
between commodity composition of Sri Lanka’s exports and that of India’s exports.   India has 
strong cooperative advantage in world trade in most labour- and resource intensive products 
exported from Sri Lanka.  
There was a notable decline in Sri Lanka’s bilateral trade deficit with India during about 
the first five years following the SLIFTA came into effect.  This declining trend has 
disappeared since then. Over the past decade, the bilateral trade deficit amounted to about five 
times of total exports to India without showing any declining trend. 
  Given the glaring asymmetry on export and import sides between Sri Lanka and India 
under the SLIFTA, India has an exorbitant bargaining power in trade negotiation with Sri 
Lanka.  This arguably accounts for India’s ability to control imports from Sri Lanka by 
resorting to various non-tariff barriers (Pal 2015), notwithstanding its stated commitment to 
honour special and differential treatment provisions.  The experience so far under the SLIFTA, 
therefore, does not augur well for Sri Lanka to obtain further market access through the ongoing 
ETCA negotiations. 
 
Si Lanka Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (SLPFTA) 
The SLPTFA was signed in July 2002 and it came to effect in June 2005.  In terms of the 
coverage of the concessions (‘positive’) list and the RoOs the agreement is virtually a mirror 
image of the ISLINDFA (Ahmad 2012).  
 
 SLPFTA cover about 80% of total Sri Lankan exports to Pakistan, but these exports 
account for a mere 0.7% of total Sri Lankan exports. Agricultural products and ago-based raw 
materials (natural rubber, vegetable products, coconut and some spices) dominate the export 
mix. The data for the past five years shows that the average utilisation of TRQs offered under 
the agreement has been very low: tea 13%; garments 4%; betel leaves: 6%.  For tea and 
garments, higher prices of Sri Lankan products compared to imports from other sources are 
considered a major reason for the low quota utilisation. Sri Lankan garment producers have 
significantly upgraded their product mixt during the past few decades and Pakistan is not 
attractive market for these products (PBC 2018).   
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Table  4: Sri Lanka‐Pakistan trade, 2012‐2017 
 Exports (US$ mn) Imports Pakistan’s share in 
Sri Lanka’s trade 
(%) 
Trade 
balance as 
% of 
exports  Total SLPFTA SLPFTA 
share in 
imports 
(%) 
 Exports Imports 
2012 82.7 60.4 73.0 353 0.8 1.8 -326.6 
2013 83.0 59.2 71.3 378 0.8 2.1 -355.1 
2014 74.3 51.8 69.7 280 0.7 1.4 -277.1 
2015 73.1 58.8 80.5 297 0.7 1.6 -306.3 
2016 63.8 51.5 80.8 304 0.6 1.6 -376.5 
2017 74.0 60.3 81.5 349 0.7 1.7 -371.6 
Source:  Compiled from data provided by the Department of Commerce and from The Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report (for total trade)  
   
 Imports from Pakistan account for about 1.7% of total Sri Lankan imports.  The product 
mix consists of woollen fabrics and bed linen, cements, fertilizer, and basmati rice.  There is 
no evidence of a notable increase in imports following the FTA came into effect.  
 At the time of negotiating the agreement, the Sri Lankan authorities expected that the 
country’s garment industry would benefit from procuring cotton yarn and fabrics from Pakistan 
(World Bank 2005).  This expectation has not materialised.   Pakistani yarn and fabric accounts 
for a small share (less than 2%) of these imposts to Sri Lanka.  This was presumably because 
garment producers must procure high quality inputs from established sources to meet the 
quality requirements demanded by the international buyers. Moreover, garment producer in Sri 
Lanka have duty free access to imports from any country under the FTZ scheme and duty rebate 
provisions available to non-FTZ firms.  
Overall, trade patterns under the SLPFTA are consistence with our analytical prior that 
trade outcome under an FTA depend crucially on the trade compatibility between the partner 
countries. Of course.  The lack of awareness of among the business community of the trade 
concessions offered in the agreement, as noted in a recent study by the Pakistan Business 
Council (Pakistan Business Council 2015), could have played a role at the margin. 
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The Sri Lanka – Singapore Free Trade agreement (SLSFTA) 
Unlike the SLIFTA and the SLPFTA, SLSFTA is a modern FTA.  It has a wider range of 
reform provisions going beyond liberalisation of  trade in goods to include other areas such as 
services, movement of professionals, telecommunications and Electronic Commerce. 
Intellectual property rights, government procurement.  Overall, the subject coverage is similar 
to the other FTAs involving Singapore.  The SLSFTA was signed on 1 Many 2018.  However, 
whether or when and in what form will the agreement come into force remain uncertain 
following the release in last November 2018  of the report of the  Committee of Experts (CoE)  
appointed by the President to evaluate it.     
Singapore is one of the most opened trading nations in the world.  Singapore’s average 
MFN applied duty rate is zero for all imports other than imports of beverages and tobacco for 
which the averaged rate varies from 1.6% to 85% (WTO 2018).  Thus, the SLSFTA is unlike 
to have a direct impact on Sri Lanka’s exports to Singapore. 
 Some commentators have expressed concern that, under the agreement’ Sri Lanka 
would be able to exports to other Southeast Asian countries with which Singapore has entered 
in to free trade agreement.  It simply reflects the popular media practice of treating ‘trade within 
FTAs’ as ‘free trade’.  This view ignores the fact that RoOs, which are an integral part of any 
FTA, preclude transhipment of goods to a third country though a FTA partner country.  
Sri Lanka has little trade compatibility with Singapore on the import side (Table 2).  
This is because, over the past three decades, Singapore’s export structure has undergone a 
dramatic transformation. Now petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, high-tech parts and 
components of electronics and surgical and scientific equipment dominate the commodity 
composition of exports.  Singapore is not a supplier of assembled (final) consumer electronics 
and electrical foods, automobiles, and low-end parts and comports of these products, which 
dominate Sri Lanka’s manufacturing imports.  Therefore, the market penetration effect in Sri 
Lanka of Singapore products under the agreement is like to be negligible.  
There is a fear that the agreement could open the door for industrial waste and other 
environmentally harmful products to enter Sri Lanka.  This would entirely depend on the 
implementation of the RoOs of the agreement by the Singapore authorities.  Given the well-
functioning instructions in Singapore with a proven record of adherence to the rule of law, one 
can hope that there would be little room for tweaking or lax implementation of the RoOs on 
Singapore’s part.  
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The Sri Lankan authorities anticipate that SLSFTA would help linking the Sri Lankan 
manufacturing sector to global production networks (global manufacturing value chain) 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2018).  How this would happen is not clearly stated in the related 
government documents.  One possibility could be Singapore-based firms operating within 
production networks relocating some sediments/tasks of the firms in Sri Lanka to exploit 
advantages from relative production cost differences.  Indeed, this process helped spreading 
production networks from Singapore to the neighbouring countries during the period from 
about the mid-1970s to the late 1990s (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon 2014). However, because 
of the dramatic industrial transformation noted above, industries such as semiconductor and 
hard disk drive with potential to shift relatively low-end activities to low-cost locations have 
already disappeared from Singapore. 
It is important to note that, the electronics firms currently in operating in Sri Lankan 
manufacturing export predominantly to countries like Japan, USA, Germany and some 
European countries. Their exports to Singapore and other ASEAN countries are minuscule, 
notwithstanding duty free access to these markets under the WTO’s Information Technology 
Agreement. 
Even if there were some opportunities for production relocation, whether the FTA 
would be an effective vehicle for facilitating the process is highly debatable, for two reasons. 
First, the very essence of global production sharing within global production networks is 
locating different segments of the production process globally, rather regionally or bilaterally. 
The relative cost advantage of producing/assembling a given part or components in the supply 
chain need not necessarily lie in a country within the jurisdictional boundaries of a specific 
FTA.  
Second, there are formidable complications relating to the application of RoOs for trade 
within global production networks.  Most of the task/segments produced/assembled within 
production networks have very thing value added margins in each location.  In addition, most 
of imports and export of parts and components trained with production fall under the same HS 
4-digit classifications. Therefore, the identification of the origin of trade within production 
network for granting tariff preferences becomes a major challenge (Athukorala & Kohpaiboon 
2011).  
 Put simply, the rise of global production sharing strengthens the case for multilateral 
(WTO-based) or unilateral, rather than regional (FTA) approach, to trade liberalisation. To 
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quote Victor Fung, the Honorary Chairman of Li & Fung, the world’s largest supply-chain 
intermediary based in Hong Kong,  
‘Bilateralism distorts flows of goods ….  In structuring the supply chain, every 
country of origin rule and every bilateral deal has to be tackled on as additional 
considerations, thus constraining companies in optimising production globally’  
       Victor Fung, Financial Times, November 3, 2005. 
These considerations suggest that more appropriate policy option for facilitating a 
country’s engagement in global production network is unilateral liberalisation or becoming a 
signatory to the ITA.  Both policy options assure unconditional duty-free access to the required 
inputs. The case for such broader liberalisation, rather than following the FTA route lies in that 
global production sharing is a global phenomenon, rather than a regional or bilateral 
phenomenon.   
One of the main envisaged gains to Sri Lanka from the SLSFTA is attracting FDI from 
Singapore.  It is expected that the provisions in the investment chapter (Chapter 10) (safeguards 
against expropriation, most-favoured nation treatment, repatriation of capital and return from 
investment) would entice Singapore investors to come to Sri Lanka.   However these provisions 
are exactly similar to those embodied in the Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty (BIPT) 
between the two countries that has been in force over three decades (since September 1980).6  
Notwithstanding this long-standing treaty, Sri Lanka has so far been able to attack only a tiny 
share of rapidly expensing oversees FDI from Singapore. The total stock of our war FDI from 
Singapore increased from US$32 billion 1994-5 to over 560 billion in 2015-16 (Table 4). 
However, during this period Singaporean FDI in Sri Lanka amounted to a mere US$ 1.2 billion 
(based on investment approval records of the Board of Investment).  This compassion is much 
in line with the available multicounty evidence that a BIPT (or an FTA with an FDI chapter, 
for that matter) is unlikely to entice foreign investors unless they are appropriately embodied 
in a broader reform addenda to improve the overall investment climate of the country 
(Hallward-Driemeier 2003).   
  
                                                            
6  https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org 
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Table 4:  Singapore's Direct Investment Abroad. 1994-2016, two-year averages (%) 
 1994-95 1999-00 2004-05 2009-10 2015-
16 
 Manufacturing 24.0 24.8 22.1 21.0 17.3 
Construction 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 8.2 6.4 5.6 6.2 8.4 
Accommodation & Food Service Activities 2.2 1.8 1.2 0.9 0.6 
Transport & Storage 4.1 4.1 4.0 2.6 2.9 
Information & Communications 0.0 2.1 5.1 4.4 4.3 
Financial & Insurance Services 49.2 48.6 53.7 49.3 48.9 
Real Estate Activities 7.0 7.3 4.1 7.7 7.6 
Professional, Scientific &  
technical, Administrative & Support Services 
2.9 2.5 1.8 1.7 3.2 
Others 1.2 1.6 1.8 5.9 6.5 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 
      US $ billion 31.5 54.8 114,5 311.3 560.4 
SOURCE: Singapore Department of Statistics:  https://data.gov.sg/ 
The data relating to the evolving patterns of outward FDI from Singapore seems to suggest 
that, even with required broader reforms, opportunities for Sri Lanka to attract Singaporean 
investors are not very promising (Table 4).  This is because there is  limited compatibility 
between the sectoral composition of Singaporean outward FDI and both Sri Lanka’s 
development priories and the current stage of economic development.  Over a half of outward 
FDI from Singapore is in the financial sector.  These investments are primarily destined to 
high-income countries.  The manufacturing share of FDI, which is relevant for Sri Lanka’s 
objective of joining global production networks, accounts for a smaller and declining share of 
total outward FDI (16% in 2015-16, compared to 25% in1994-95).   MNEs accounts for the 
lion’s share of Singapore’s manufacturing industry (over 80% output).  As noted, the SLSFTA 
is unlikely to be relevant for these MNEs because they make investment location decisions at 
their headquarters based of a wider inter-country assessment. 
  
Concluding remarks 
The role of FTAs in trade expansion is vastly exaggerated in the Sri Lankan policy debate.  
Most politicians, and much of the media, often do not seem understand the distinction between 
‘free trade’ and ‘trade under FTAs’.  FTAs are essentially preferential trade deals the actual 
trade effect of which is conditioned by the choice of commodity coverage, which is basically 
determined by political considerations and lobby group pressure, and the rules of origin.  
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The failure to make progress with the process of multilateral liberation under the WTO 
does not make a valid case for giving priority to FTAs. The proliferation of FTAs over the past 
three decades has been driven largely by several non-economic factors, including the 
bandwagon effects.  If the road to multilateral approach to trade reforms is closed, then the 
better and time-honored alternative is unilateral liberalization combined with appropriate 
supply-side reforms.  
Not withstand the proliferation of FTAs, the actual coverage of these agreements  in 
world trade much lower that portrayed in the Sri Lankan debate. Over 80% of world trade still 
take place under the standard most favor nation (MFN) tariff system.  The outcome of FTAs 
or unilateral liberalization depends crucially on supply-side reforms needed to improve firms’ 
capability to reap gains from market opening.  However, even with effective supply-side 
reforms, FTAs would not promote trade in the absence of significant compatibility in trade 
patterns of the partner countries. Trade compatibility depends on the nature of economic 
structures and the stage of development of the countries.  Location of the countries in the same 
region (the ‘neighborhood’ factor) does not necessarily ensure trade compatibility. Our 
estimates of trade compatibility and the analysis of the experience under the SLIFTA and 
SLPFTA cast doubt on potential trade gains from signing FTAs with countries in the region.  
Giving priory to FTA is the national trade and development strategy is not consistent 
with the government’s objective of linking domestic manufacturing to global production 
networks (global manufacturing value chain).  Global production sharing is a global, not 
necessarily a regional phenomenon. The relative cost advantage of producing/assembling a 
given part or components in the supply chain need not necessarily lie in a country within the 
jurisdictional boundaries of a specific FTA.  There is no evidence to support the view that Sri 
Lanka need an ‘intermediary’ country (Singapore) to join production networks. The electronics 
films currently in operating in Sri Lankan manufacturing export predominantly to countries 
like Japan, USA, Germany and some European countries.  Their exports to Singapore and other 
ASEAN countries minuscule, notwithstanding duty free access to these markets under the 
WTO’s Information Technology Agreement. 
Proliferation of FTAs has the adverse side effect of diverting government attention from 
other development prerequisites.  Overlapping of the standard MFN tariffs with FTA tariff 
concessions and multiple RoOs attached FTAs weaken efficiency improvements in the custom 
system, and opens opportunities for corruption. 
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The available evidence on the role of FTAs in attracting FDI is mixed, at best. The only 
policy inference one can make from this evidence is that FTAs can play a role at the margin in 
enticing foreign investors, provided the other preconditions on the supply side are met. 
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